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COMMENT
THE KIDS AREN’T ALRIGHT: THE ROAD TO ABANDONING
DECEPTIVE INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES FOR JUVENILE
SUSPECTS IN MARYLAND
ALLISON STILLINGHAGAN*
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the
right against self-incrimination.1 This protection allows a person to decline
to provide incriminating information during an interrogation or at trial.
Under Miranda v. Arizona,2 police officers inform suspects of a crime of this
protection when officers read the Miranda rights, which include the right to
remain silent.3 However, during an interrogation, police officers often utilize
psychologically deceptive techniques to elicit a confession from a suspect
whom they believe is guilty. One such interrogation strategy is the Reid
Technique,4 which has become the interrogation technique most widely used
by police officers in the United States.5 Deceptive interrogation techniques
have been shown to lead to more false confessions than transparent
questioning.6 In cases of wrongful convictions that have been overturned

© 2022 Allison Stillinghagan.
*
J.D. Candidate, 2023, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3. Id. at 478–79 (holding that, prior to interrogation, police officers must remind criminal
suspects of their Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination by informing suspects of
their right to remain silent, the fact that any statements made will be used against the suspect in
court, the suspect’s right to have an attorney present during interrogation, and the fact that, if they
cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided to them).
4. See id. at 450 (stating that, under the Reid Technique, officers are instructed to “minimize
the moral seriousness of the offense[] [and] to cast blame on the victim or on society . . . [in order]
to put the subject in a psychological state where his story is but an elaboration of what the police
purport to know already—that he is guilty. Explanations to the contrary are dismissed and
discouraged.” (footnotes omitted)).
5. See In re Elias V., 188 Cal. Rptr. 3d 202, 211 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015) (“It has been estimated
that about two-thirds of police executives in this nation have had training in the ‘Reid technique.’”
(citing Marvin Zalman & Brad W. Smith, The Attitudes of Police Executives Toward Miranda and
Interrogation Policies, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 873, 920 (2007))).
6. Ariel Spierer, Note, The Right to Remain a Child: The Impermissibility of the Reid
Technique in Juvenile Interrogations, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1720, 1730 n.75 (2017).
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using DNA evidence, about 30% of the wrongful convictions involved a false
confession.7
Deceptive techniques tend to cause heightened concern when used in
cases involving juvenile suspects.8 Children and adolescents are more
susceptible to deception in interrogation situations than adults.9 Juveniles do
not yet have a fully developed prefrontal cortex,10 meaning that they are not
yet fully able to control impulsivity or fully consider the lasting consequences
of their actions.11 A child or adolescent is more likely to succumb to coercion
during an interrogation than an adult under the same circumstances.12 In fact,
more than one-third of false confessions are given by juveniles.13 Deceptive
interrogation techniques have been noted in several high-profile cases of
juveniles who produced false confessions, such as the now-exonerated
Central Park Five14 and the more recent case of Brendan Dassey.15
On July 15, 2021, the Governor of Illinois signed Senate Bill 2122 into
16
law, which prohibits law enforcement officers from deceiving juvenile

7. Oregon Deception Bill Is Signed into Law, Banning Police from Lying to Youth During
Interrogations, INNOCENCE PROJECT (July 14, 2021), https://innocenceproject.org/deception-billpasses-oregon-legislature-banning-police-from-lying-to-youth-during-interrogations/.
8. Id.
9. Spierer, supra note 6, at 1730.
10. Megan Crane, Laura Nirider & Steven A. Drizin, The Truth About Juvenile False
Confessions, INSIGHTS ON L. & SOC’Y, Winter 2016, at 12. The prefrontal cortex is the portion of
the brain that contributes to problem-solving, decision-making, and impulse control, and is not fully
developed until a person reaches adulthood—typically in their early- to mid-twenties. Id.
11. See id. (stating that “youths’ brains are not yet fully developed in areas relating to judgment
and decision-making, giving rise to classic ‘teenager’ traits like impulsivity, vulnerability to
pressure and suggestibility, as well as a tendency to be motivated by short-term rewards”).
12. See, e.g., id. (referencing “[a]nother study of 340 exonerations [that] found that 42% of
juveniles studied had falsely confessed, compared with only 13% of adults”).
13. In re Elias V., 188 Cal. Rptr. 3d 202, 218 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015).
14. The “Central Park Five” refers to a group of five teenagers who were wrongly convicted of
rape and assault of a woman in New York City. The boys all produced false confessions after being
subjected to deceptive interrogation techniques by the questioning officers. Even though there was
DNA found on the scene that did not match any of the five boys, the confessions proved to be
persuasive enough for jury members to convict all five teenagers. Steven A. Drizin & Richard A.
Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-DNA World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 891, 894–900
(2004).
15. Brian Gallini, The Interrogations of Brendan Dassey, 102 MARQ. L. REV. 777, 792–814
(2019). Dassey’s interrogation was filmed, and portions of the video were included in the Netflix
series “Making a Murderer,” sparking public outrage over the manipulative tactics utilized by the
questioning officer, including leading questions to develop the story of the crime for Dassey (who
otherwise did not know any details of the event) and false promises of immediate relief for Dassey
if he confessed. Id. at 778–81.
16. Bill Status of SB2122: 102nd General Assembly, ILL. GEN. ASSEMBLY,
https://www.ilga.gov/legislation/BillStatus.asp?DocNum=2122&GAID=16&DocTypeID=SB&Se
ssionID=110&GA=102 (last visited Mar. 29, 2022) [hereinafter Bill Status of SB2122].
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suspects during custodial interrogations.17 This law bans techniques such as
lying about protections that will be afforded to the juvenile and claiming to
have false evidence in order to secure a confession.18 Any confession made
by a juvenile suspect who was subject to such deceptive techniques during
an interrogation will be deemed inadmissible as evidence.19 This law went
into effect on January 1, 2022.20 A similar law banning the use of deceptive
interrogation techniques on juvenile suspects has been passed in Oregon and
was also enacted on January 1, 2022.21 Taking inspiration from these recent
statutes, this Comment will explain why the Maryland General Assembly
must implement statutory protections for juvenile suspects by banning the
use of deceptive interrogation techniques when interrogating juveniles to
protect their Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. Part I will
explore the recent trends in police interrogation methods in the United States,
highlight concerns for juveniles in interrogations, discuss current
interrogation techniques practiced in Maryland, and evaluate the recent
legislation passed in Illinois and Oregon.22 Part II will analyze specific
concerns for juveniles in the context of false confessions, call attention to
injustices in Maryland’s current interrogation practices, and, finally,
introduce a model statute for the Maryland General Assembly that bans the
use of deceptive interrogation techniques for juvenile suspects while urging
the General Assembly to require implementation of a new method of police
interrogation.23
I. BACKGROUND
Prior to the 1930s, an interrogation technique referred to as the “third
degree” was commonplace among American law enforcement, with
interrogating officers resorting to physical torment in an attempt to obtain

17. S.B. 2122, 102nd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2021). The bill defines “custodial
interrogation” to mean “any interrogation (i) during which a reasonable person in the subject’s
position would consider himself or herself to be in custody and (ii) during which a question is asked
that is reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.” Id.
18. Id. The bill defines “deception” as “the knowing communication of false facts about
evidence or unauthorized statements regarding leniency by a law enforcement officer or juvenile
officer to a subject of custodial interrogation.” Id.
19. Id.
20. 2022 Ill. Legis. Serv. P.A. 102-101 (West); see also Bill Status of SB2122, supra note 16.
The new statute is now codified within the Criminal Procedure article of the Illinois Compiled
Statutes and is titled “Prohibition of deceptive tactics.” 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-401.6 (2022);
725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/103-2.2 (2022).
21. S.B. 418, 81st Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2021).
22. See infra Part I.
23. See infra Part II.
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information and confessions from criminal suspects.24 By the mid-twentieth
century, interrogations had shifted away from physical brutality and, instead,
psychological techniques designed to elicit confessions from suspects
became commonplace during questioning.25 Such techniques pose concern,
specifically in the context of interrogating juvenile suspects.26 On January 1,
2022, Illinois and Oregon became the first states to enact legislation designed
to ban the use of deception by law enforcement officers when interrogating
juvenile suspects.27 Section I.A of this Comment will provide an overview
of the transition from the third degree to modern day interrogation
techniques. Section I.B introduces the concern for juveniles who are
subjected to deceptive interrogation techniques. Section I.C will analyze
Maryland case law regarding interrogation practices and current interrogation
techniques used in the State. Finally, Section I.D will introduce and analyze
the recent laws passed in other states that ban the use of deceptive
interrogation techniques with juvenile suspects.
A. The Transition from the Third Degree to Modern Interrogation
Techniques
The Supreme Court of the United States condemned the third degree
interrogation technique in the early-1900s, finding physical violence and
manipulation to be unconstitutionally coercive in obtaining confessions.28
Soon after, Fred Inbau, John Reid, and Joseph Buckley developed a police
interrogation method known as the Reid Technique, which quickly became
one of the standard methods of interrogation across the country.29 To protect
the due process rights of criminal suspects following the transition from the
third degree to modern psychological tactics, including the Reid Technique,
the Supreme Court ushered in the requirement to read the Miranda rights to
all criminal suspects prior to interrogation, finding that procedural safeguards

24. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445–46 (1966) (“[P]olice violence and the ‘third
degree’ flourished [in the early 1930s]. . . . [T]he police resorted to physical brutality—beating,
hanging, whipping—and to sustained and protracted questioning incommunicado in order to extort
confessions.” (footnote omitted)).
25. See id. at 448 (stating that “the modern practice of in-custody interrogation is
psychologically rather than physically oriented”).
26. See, e.g., In re Elias V., 188 Cal. Rptr. 3d 202, 224 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015) (reversing the
conviction of a thirteen-year-old boy based on a confession of guilt because “[t]he false evidence
and other deceptive techniques employed in this case to induce a 13-year-old adolescent to
incriminate himself create substantial doubt about both the voluntariness of [the adolescent’s]
inculpatory statements and the truth of those statements”).
27. S.B. 2122, 102nd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2021); S.B. 418, 81st Leg. Assemb., Reg.
Sess. (Or. 2021).
28. See infra Section I.A.1.
29. See infra Section I.A.2.
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are required to protect the Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination.30
1. The United States Supreme Court Condemned the Third Degree,
Hastening the Shift Towards Psychological Interrogation Tactics
In 1936, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled in Brown v.
Mississippi31 that confessions coerced by physical torture cannot be used as
the basis for a criminal defendant’s conviction.32 The Court held such tactics
to be unconstitutional, finding that physically coerced convictions violate the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause,33 which prohibits states from
“depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law.”34 Four years later, the Court publicly condemned Florida police
officers for implementing physically abusive interrogation techniques in the
case of Chambers v. Florida.35 The Court found that the confessions of four
men were obtained by coercion and given under duress because police
officers subjected the suspects to sleep and food deprivation, threats of
violence, and prolonged questioning for days on end.36 The Court held that
this form of coercive questioning was in violation of the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, stating, “[t]o permit human lives to be
forfeited upon confessions thus obtained would make of the constitutional
requirement of due process of law a meaningless symbol.”37
Thereafter, in 1948, the Supreme Court reversed a fifteen-year-old boy’s
conviction in the case of Haley v. Ohio38 because the lower courts’ ruling
could not be “squared” with the Court’s holding in Chambers.39 The Court
determined that the defendant’s confession had been obtained in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause and was thus involuntary.40
The Court stated that “when, as here, a mere child—an easy victim of the
law—is before us, special care in scrutinizing the record must be used.”41
The Court found the conduct of the officers to be coercive based on the
defendant’s age, the length of the interrogation and time of day at which he
was interrogated, the fact that he did not have an attorney present, and the
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

See infra Section I.A.3.
297 U.S. 278 (1936).
Id. at 286–87.
Id.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
309 U.S. 227 (1940).
Id. at 240.
Id.
332 U.S. 596 (1948).
Id. at 597.
Id. at 599, 601.
Id. at 599.
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cruel attitude of the officers, all of which “convince[d] [the Court] that this
was a confession wrung from a child by means which the law should not
sanction.”42 Notably, the Court denounced the assumption that “a boy of
fifteen, without aid of counsel, would have a full appreciation of [his
constitutional rights].”43 In doing so, the Court acknowledged a need for
more age-appropriate interrogation standards for juvenile suspects.44
2. The Reid Technique for Police Interrogation Became One of the
Most Popular Interrogation Methods Following Its Initial
Publication in the 1960s
Following the Court’s criticism of the third degree method in Brown and
Chambers, law enforcement agencies began to phase out such brutal
interrogation methods, and by the 1960s a new method known as the Reid
Technique had become commonplace among law enforcement agencies
across the country.45 The Reid Technique was created by John Reid and first
published in the 1962 book, Criminal Interrogation and Confessions, by
himself and Fred E. Inbau.46 The Reid Technique describes two
recommended courses of interrogation: one for suspects whose “guilt is
definite or reasonably certain” and another for suspects whose “guilt is
doubtful or uncertain.”47 The book also includes several general tips for
criminal interrogations of all types.48
Many of the tactics for the interrogation of suspects whose guilt is
definite or reasonably certain are designed to minimize the seriousness of the
offense, specifically: telling the suspect “that anyone else under similar
conditions or circumstances might have done the same thing”;49 suggesting
that the suspect committed the crime for a morally acceptable reason;50
placing blame for the crime on the victim or criminal accomplice;51 and
suggesting that the victim of the crime was to blame.52 Other tactics are more
straightforward and aggressive, such as: pointing out the subject’s guilty state
42. Id. at 601.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. See In re Elias V., 188 Cal. Rptr. 3d 202, 211 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015) (stating that the creators
of the Reid Technique are the largest providers of interrogation technique training across the United
States and that “[i]t has been estimated that about two-thirds of police executives in this nation have
had training in the ‘Reid Technique’”).
46. FRED E. INBAU & JOHN E. REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS (2d ed.
1967).
47. Id. at 24.
48. Id. at 108.
49. Id. at 38.
50. Id. at 43.
51. Id. at 47.
52. Id. at 64.
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of mind;53 emphasizing the “futility of resistance” to truthfully confessing;54
and pointing out the negative consequences of continued criminal behavior.55
While the techniques suggested for interrogations of suspects whose
guilt is doubtful or uncertain are less manipulative and aggressive, the Reid
Technique baselessly asserts that many behaviors exhibited by a suspect
during interrogation are indicative of guilt.56 Inbau and Reid state that, if a
suspect attempts to explain nonexistent evidence away, this indicates guilt.57
Moreover, if a theft suspect offers to pay restitution for the alleged offense,
this indicates guilt.58 Additionally, a guilty person will be more likely than
an innocent person to refuse to submit to a lie detector test,59 and a suspect
who agrees to say whatever the interrogator wants while remaining adamant
about their innocence is most likely guilty.60 The book does not offer any
factual basis or research to support the assertion that such statements and
behaviors show a likelihood of guilt.61 The Reid Technique became so
prominent among American law enforcement that the Supreme Court of the
United States referenced the technique in Miranda v. Arizona,62 citing to the
Reid Technique when considering the significant risk of self-incrimination
during interrogations.63

3. In the 1960s, the Supreme Court’s Holdings in Two Landmark

Cases Impacted Police Interrogation Techniques by Introducing
the Mandatory Reading and Explanation of All Suspects’
Constitutional Rights and by Expanding Fifth Amendment
Protections to Juveniles

In 1966, the Supreme Court’s decision in Miranda v. Arizona led to
national implementation of procedural safeguards to protect criminal
53. Id. at 33.
54. Id. at 77.
55. Id.
56. There are no citations to, discussions about, or mentions of research or statistics that support
any claims made regarding behaviors that are indicative of guilt at any point in Criminal
Interrogation and Confessions. Yet, such statements are phrased as absolute truths. See, e.g., Brian
R. Gallini, Police “Science” in the Interrogation Room: Seventy Years of Pseudo-Psychological
Interrogation Methods to Obtain Inadmissible Confessions, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 529, 565 (2010)
(stating that that Reid Technique was created solely as “a result of many years of [personal]
experience, primarily on the part of the staff of John E. Reid & Associates” (quoting FRED E. INBAU,
JOHN E. REID & JOSEPH P. BUCKLEY, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 212 (3d ed.
1986)).
57. INBAU & REID, supra note 46, at 103.
58. Id. at 106.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 108.
61. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
62. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
63. See infra notes 71–72 and accompanying text.
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suspects’ Fifth Amendment rights.64 The Court addressed the admissibility
of confessions made by a suspect during custodial interrogation,65 finding
that “[e]ven without employing brutality . . . the very fact of custodial
interrogation exacts a heavy toll on individual liberty” and takes advantage
of individual weaknesses.66 The Court’s opinion contained citations to the
Reid Technique67 and described the psychologically oriented tactics that
replaced the physical brutality of the third degree method of interrogation as
“psychological conditioning.”68 In describing the Reid Technique, the Court
stated that:
[O]fficers are instructed to minimize the moral seriousness of the
offense, to cast blame on the victim or on society. These tactics
are designed to put the subject in a psychological state where his
story is but an elaboration of what the police purport to know
already—that he is guilty. Explanations to the contrary are
dismissed and discouraged.69
The Court further noted how the interrogation environment created through
such techniques “is not physical intimidation, but it is equally destructive of
human dignity.”70
Upon consideration of modern interrogation techniques, the Court “can
readily perceive an intimate connection between the privilege against selfincrimination and police custodial questioning,”71 and “adequate protective
devices” are necessary to uphold the principle that a person shall not be
required to incriminate themselves by making a statement that is not truly
“the product of . . . free choice.”72 Thus, the Court introduced what is now
commonly known as the Miranda warning, holding that:
[W]hen an individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived
of his freedom by the authorities in any significant way and is
subjected to questioning . . . . [h]e must be warned prior to any
questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he

64.Id. at 479.
65. “Custodial interrogation” is defined as the “[q]uestioning of a detained person by the police
in connection with a criminal investigation.” Custodial Interrogation, CORNELL LEGAL INFO.
INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/custodial_interrogation (last visited Apr. 4, 2022).
66. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 455.
67. Id. at nn.9–23. Notably, Inbau & Reid published the second edition of the Reid Technique
in 1967 with a preface noting that the authors made slight edits to the Technique in a “contentious
effort to conform to the requirements recently established by the Court.” INBAU & REID, supra note
46, at vii. The second edition of the Reid Technique includes a section briefly explaining the newly
required Miranda warnings but is otherwise largely unchanged. Id. at 4–5.
68. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 454.
69. Id. at 450 (footnotes omitted).
70. Id. at 457.
71. Id. at 458.
72. Id.
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says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right
to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an
attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if
he so desires.73
The Court further held that an individual may exercise any one of these
rights at any time throughout the interrogation, and also may choose to
“knowingly and intelligently” waive the rights.74 Following the holding in
Miranda, if an officer fails to read a suspect their Miranda rights and the
defendant fails to demonstrate a waiver of these rights, any evidence obtained
during an interrogation cannot be used against the defendant at trial.75
Soon after the Miranda decision, the Supreme Court heard the 1967 case
In re Gault.76 The case reached the Supreme Court after fifteen-year-old
Gerald Gault was denied the ability to appeal his conviction due to an Arizona
state law prohibiting appeals in juvenile cases.77 The Arizona law denied
juvenile defendants any right to a notice of the charge(s) brought against
them, the right to legal counsel, the right to confrontation and crossexamination of witnesses during a criminal trial, the right against selfincrimination, the right to obtain a transcript of the court proceedings, and
the right to appellate review of trial court rulings.78 The Court held that the
Fourteenth Amendment due process rights must be given to juvenile criminal
defendants,79 stating:
Failure to observe the fundamental requirements of due process has
resulted in instances, which might have been avoided, of unfairness
to individuals and inadequate or inaccurate findings of fact and
unfortunate prescriptions of remedy. Due process of law is the
primary and indispensable foundation of individual freedom. It is
the basic and essential term in the social compact which defines
the rights of the individual and delimits the powers which the state
may exercise.80
The Court found that sentencing a juvenile defendant to any institution
at which the juvenile’s freedom is restricted requires due process of law, thus
holding that juvenile defendants and their parents must be informed of the
defendant’s right to legal counsel.81 The Court further held that the Fifth
Amendment protection against self-incrimination applies equally to adult and
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 478–79.
Id.
Id.
397 U.S. 1 (1967).
Id. at 8.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 41.
Id. at 19–20.
Id. at 41.
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juvenile defendants.82 The Court emphasized that “[n]o reason is suggested
or appears for a different rule in respect [to] sworn testimony in juvenile
courts than in adult tribunals,” concluding that the constitutional rights
afforded to adult criminal defendants must also be guaranteed to juveniles.83
B. The Supreme Court of the United States Raised Concerns About a
Lack of Consideration of Age and Development in J.D.B. v. North
Carolina
In the 2011 case of J.D.B. v. North Carolina,84 the Supreme Court of the
United States held that a minor’s age properly informs determination of
whether an individual is being held in custody because a reasonable child
subjected to police questioning would feel pressured to comply, whereas a
reasonable adult in the same situation would feel free to go.85 The J.D.B.
Court found that a child’s age “is a fact that ‘generates commonsense
conclusions about behavior and perception,’”86 explaining that common
sense and “‘community experience’ . . . make[] it possible . . . ‘to determine
what is to be expected’ of children in other contexts [and also] makes it
possible to know what to expect of children subjected to police
questioning.”87
The Court’s analysis addressed the need for unique considerations in
custodial analysis for juvenile suspects and included several references to
concerns about juvenile interrogations. The Court acknowledged that police
interrogation is inherently stressful and pressures a “frighteningly high
percentage of people” to falsely confess, with this risk being even higher for
juvenile suspects.88 The Court also stated that the consideration of a juvenile
suspect’s age when interrogating or questioning the suspect does not impose
a burden on the questioning officers nor does it inhibit the ability for the
officers to do their job.89 The questioning officers “need no imaginative
powers, knowledge of developmental psychology, training in cognitive
science, or expertise in social and cultural anthropology to account for a
child’s age. They simply need the common sense to know that a [child] is
not a [teenager] . . . [or] an adult.”90 The Court acknowledged that the
82. Id. at 55.
83. Id. at 56.
84. 564 U.S. 261 (2011).
85. Id. at 264–65.
86. Id. at 272 (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 674 (2004) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting)).
87. Id. at 274 (citations omitted) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283A cmt. b
(AM. L. INST. 1965)).
88. Id. at 269 (quoting Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 321 (2009)).
89. Id. at 271.
90. Id. at 279–80.
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differences between juveniles and adults are common knowledge, thus
requiring consideration in the context of law enforcement processes.91
C. Maryland Case Law Addressing Interrogations and Current
Interrogation Techniques Utilized in the State Do Not Include
Effective Special Considerations for Juvenile Suspects
Interrogation techniques in Maryland are guided by case law, statutes,
and trainings provided by the State. Maryland courts have refined an analysis
to determine voluntariness of confessions over the course of several cases,
looking at the totality of the circumstances in order to determine whether a
confession was coerced.92 The State also issues interrogation training
through the Maryland Police and Correctional Training Commissions, which
provide guidance on interrogation techniques and tactics.93 Finally, the
Maryland General Assembly has added to existing interrogation procedural
requirements by enacting statutes requiring electronic recording of
interrogations and notification of parents or legal guardians of juveniles who
are arrested and taken into custody for questioning.94
1. Maryland Case Law Analyzing the Voluntariness of Confessions
Examines the Totality of the Circumstances Surrounding a
Confession
For decades, Maryland courts have held that, in criminal cases, the State
has the burden to prove that a confession was free and voluntary and that
there was no coercion through force, false promises, or threats in order for
the confession to be admissible as evidence.95 Additionally, when analyzing
91. Id.
92. See infra Section I.C.1.
93. See infra Section I.C.2.
94. Id.
95. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 189 Md. 596, 603–04, 56 A.2d 818, 821–22 (1948) (“Before a
confession can be admitted in evidence, the State must show, to the satisfaction of the court, that it
was the free and voluntary act of an accused; that no force or coercion was exercised by the officers
obtaining the confession, to cause the accused to confess; that no hope or promise was held out to
an accused for the purpose of inducing him to confess.”); Jackson v. State, 209 Md. 390, 394, 121
A.2d 242, 244 (1956) (“The state must show ‘that no force or coercion was exercised by the officers
obtaining the confession, to cause the accused to confess.’” (quoting Linkins v. State, 202 Md. 212,
222, 96 A.2d 246, 251 (1953))); Presley v. State, 224 Md. 550, 559, 168 A.2d 510, 514 (1961) (“It
is the well established law of this State that in order for a confession to be admitted into evidence,
the State must prove that it was voluntary and not a product of force, or threats, and was not the
result of any promises whereby the accused might be led to believe that there would be a partial or
total abandonment of the prosecution.”); Abbott v. State, 231 Md. 462, 465, 190 A.2d 797, 799
(1963) (“The rule regarding the admissibility of a confession is that the State must prove that it was
freely and voluntarily given and that it was not the product of force or of a promise, threat or
inducement whereby the accused might be led to believe that there would be a partial or total
abandonment of prosecution.”).
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the voluntariness of confessions, the courts do not look to whether the subject
of interrogation was afraid or intimidated, but instead consider whether the
confession was given freely and voluntarily and whether the subject “knew
and understood” what they were saying.96 The Court of Appeals of Maryland
has continued to refine its analysis of the voluntariness of confessions over
the years, but these core rules have not changed.
In the 1965 case of Streams v. State,97 the Court of Appeals reversed the
conviction of an eighteen-year-old male after finding that the false promises
made by the questioning officers amounted to coercion of the suspect’s
confession.98 The court held that the defendant’s confession was involuntary
because the questioning officer made promises of recommending probation
for him if he did confess, while threatening to “throw the book” at the
defendant and recommend a lengthy jail sentence if he did not confess.99 The
court found these false promises and threatening statements to be especially
coercive considering the defendant’s eighth grade education level,100 stating
that the false promises “might well have led [the defendant], in light of his
age and his apparent lack of mental capacity, to the conclusion that the sooner
he told the police what they wanted him to tell, the sooner he would be
returned to his home.”101 Thus, the court found that the confession had been
given involuntarily.102
In 1967, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland analyzed the totality
of the circumstances to determine if a confession was given “freely and
voluntarily” and therefore admissible in the case of State v. Hill.103 The court
described the totality of the circumstances analysis as determining whether a
confession was “extracted by any sort of threats, or violence, or obtained by
any direct or implied promises, however[] slight, or by the exertion of any
improper influence.”104 The court used the totality of the circumstances
standard in determining that the trial court erred in finding the defendant’s
confession to have been given involuntarily because the judge did not
thoroughly inquire upon the circumstances of the confession.105 The case
was remanded for further analysis of the defendant’s confession in light of
the totality of the circumstances.106
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Mundell v. State, 244 Md. 91, 93, 223 A.2d 184, 185 (1966).
238 Md. 278, 208 A.2d 614 (1965).
Id. at 282, 208 A.2d at 615.
Id. at 281, 208 A.2d at 615.
Id.
Id. at 282, 208 A.2d at 615.
Id. at 282–83, 208 A.2d at 616.
State v. Hill, 2 Md. App. 594, 236 A.2d 27 (1967).
Id. at 601, 236 A.2d at 30–31.
Id. at 602, 236 A.2d at 31.
Id.
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In 1979, the Court of Appeals again reversed a conviction because it
found the defendant’s confession to have been coerced in the case of Hillard
v. State,107 introducing the Hillard test used in analysis of the voluntariness
of confessions.108 The court’s finding of coercion was based on a false
promise made by the interrogating officer in the case, who promised the
defendant “special consideration” in exchange for a confession of guilt.109
The Hillard court applied a two-pronged test for declaring a confession
involuntary: (1) The interrogating officers or representatives of the officers
must have said or implied that a confession would benefit the suspect; and
(2) the suspect must have relied on this promise in giving the confession.110
The court first held that the confession was involuntary because the
questioning officer promised the suspect that, should he confess, the detective
would “go to bat” for him with the state’s attorney’s office and the court.111
The court then held that the suspect relied on that promise of implied leniency
in confessing.112 Today, Maryland courts continue to apply the two-pronged
Hillard test when analyzing confession admissibility.113
In 1986, the Court of Special Appeals evaluated the admissibility of a
confession given by a ten-year-old suspect in the case of In re Lucas F.114
The court held that a ten-year-old child was “entitled to the counseling and
guidance of a parent or guardian before he or she may validly waive the
constitutional rights protected by Miranda.”115 Although the juvenile suspect
had technically waived his Miranda rights, the court held that this waiver was
meaningless because of his young age and the fact that the interrogating
officers did not inform the suspect that his mother was present in the next
room.116 However, the court did note that if the State is able to prove that a
juvenile suspect “had the mental capacity to comprehend the significance of
Miranda and the rights waived,” then a trial judge may justifiably accept a
waiver according to the discretion of the court and based on the facts of the
case.117
107. 286 Md. 145, 406 A.2d 415 (1979).
108. See infra Section II.B.
109. Hillard, 286 Md. at 153, 406 A.2d at 420.
110. See id. (“[U]nder Maryland criminal law, independent of any federal constitutional
requirement, if an accused is told, or it is implied, that making an inculpatory statement will be to
his advantage, in that he will be given help or some special consideration, and he makes remarks in
reliance on that inducement, his declaration will be considered to have been involuntarily made and
therefore inadmissible.”).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See infra Section II.B.
114. 68 Md. App. 97, 510 A.2d 270 (1986).
115. Id. at 104, 510 A.2d at 274.
116. Id.
117. Id.
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The Court of Appeals emphasized the importance of considering the
age, mental capacity, education, experience, and suggestibility of a suspect
when determining whether a confession was entered into voluntarily in the
1986 case of Lodowski v. State.118 Similar to the Court of Special Appeals in
State v. Hill, the court applied the totality of the circumstances standard to
measure the voluntariness of a confession.119 The Lodowski court lists factors
to be considered under the totality of the circumstances standard, including:
[T]he defendant’s physical condition; promises of official help and
threat of a long sentence; the defendant’s age and lack of mental
capacity; undue long periods of interrogation and ‘persistent
hammering by relays of officers’; physical mistreatment, including
depriving a prisoner of food, drink, or rest; various characteristics
of the defendant, such as ‘age, intelligence, education, race[,]
experience[,] . . . suggestability and liability of intimidation’;
unlawful arrest; defendant’s use of narcotics; threat and
inducement.120
In the 2001 case of Winder v. State,121 the Maryland Court of Appeals
stated that courts should “look to all of the elements of the interrogation to
determine whether a suspect’s confession was given to the police through the
exercise of free will or was coerced through the use of improper means.”122
The Winder court applied the two-pronged test from Hillard, ruling that a
confession would be considered involuntary if a police officer promised or
implied that a suspect will receive special consideration or benefits in
exchange for the confession, and if the suspect then made a confession in
reliance on that statement by the police officer.123 In this case, the
questioning officers repeatedly promised the suspect that, if he confessed to
the murder he was accused of, they would convince the state prosecutor and
judge to be lenient in sentencing and offer protection to the suspect from an
“alleged angry mob” of local citizens.124 The court found that these promises,
along with the suspect’s reliance on the inducements in making his
confession, met both prongs of the Hillard test.125 The Court deemed the
confession involuntary, held that the trial court erred in declining to suppress
118. 307 Md. 233, 254–55, 513 A.2d 299, 311 (1986).
119. State v. Hill, 2 Md. App. 594, 601, 236 A.2d 27, 30 (1967) ( “[T]he standard by which the
admissibility of Hill’s pre-Miranda statement is to be measured is whether, under the totality of all
the attendant circumstances, the statement was given freely and voluntarily.” (footnote omitted)).
120. Lodowski, 307 Md. at 254–55, 513 A.2d at 311 (citations omitted) (first quoting Mefford v.
State, 235 Md. 497, 512, 201 A.2d 824, 831 (1964); then quoting Green v. State, 236 Md. 334, 339,
203 A.2d 870, 872 (1964)).
121. 362 Md. 275, 765 A.2d 97 (2001).
122. Id. at 307, 765 A.2d at 114.
123. Id. at 309, 765 A.2d at 115.
124. Id. at 317, 765 A.2d at 119.
125. Id. at 320–21, 765 A.2d at 121–22.
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the confession as inadmissible evidence, and remanded the case for a new
trial.126
2. Interrogation Techniques Currently Practiced in Maryland
Maryland interrogation techniques are currently based upon precedent
set by the Maryland courts, state statutes, and techniques distributed by the
Maryland Police Training and Standards Commission and the Maryland
Correctional Training Commission.127 The state legislature created the
Maryland Police and Correctional Training Commissions to oversee and
govern the certification and training of police and correctional officers in
Maryland.128 The Commissions produce model interrogation policies to be
implemented and followed by law enforcement agencies in Maryland,
detailing the practices and goals associated with custodial interrogations of
suspects.129 The model policies define interrogation questioning procedures
as being “specifically designed to elicit incriminating responses implicating
the person in criminal activity.”130 According to the guiding principles for
interrogations, questioning officers have “no authority to offer promises of
leniency or special consideration as inducements for admissions or
cooperation. This subtle form of coercion is prohibited.”131 This prohibition
is in line with the case law discussed above, reflecting the state’s disapproval
of coercion through false promises of leniency that a defendant may rely upon
when making a confession.132
The model policies include a section with special considerations for
interrogating juveniles.133 The policies specify that the voluntariness of a
juvenile suspect’s confession made during interrogation “depends on factors
such as: age; experience; education; background; intelligence; capacity to
understand his or her rights and the consequences of waiving them; and
presence of a parent during the interrogation.”134 This is again reflective of
Maryland case law, as the courts have regularly analyzed confessions under

126. Id.
127. See infra Section II.2.
128. MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 3-202 (2022) (establishing the Maryland Police Training
and Standards Commission); MD. CODE ANN., CORR. SERVS. § 8-203 (2022) (establishing the
Maryland Correctional Training Commission).
129. MD. POLICE & CORR. TRAINING COMM’NS, MODEL POLICIES FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT IN
MARYLAND 56–59 (2007) [hereinafter MD. MODEL POLICIES].
130. Id. at 56. Note how these policies are not designed to elicit the true facts surrounding
crimes.
131. Id. at 58.
132. See supra Section I.B.1.
133. MD. MODEL POLICIES, supra note 129, at 58.
134. Id.
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the totality of the circumstances standard.135 The section dedicated to
juvenile suspects is brief, including only three major provisions: (a) police
are advised to inform a juvenile suspect that they have the right to consult
their parents or guardians; (b) interrogation of juveniles is suggested to be
limited in length and to include periodic breaks; and (c) there should be a
limited number of officers participating in the interrogation.136
In addition, the State of Maryland requires the electronic recording of
interrogations.137 Recording interrogations benefits criminal suspects,
questioning officers, and the justice system as a whole by creating a concrete
and indisputable record of the interrogation that can be referred to and
introduced at trial if needed.138 Furthermore, the State requires police officers
to attempt to notify a juvenile’s parent or guardian upon arrest of the
juvenile.139 This statute aims to ensure that juveniles accused of a crime are
able to benefit from an adult’s involvement; however, the actual requirements
in the statute are not always sufficient to implement the intended benefits.140
D. Illinois and Oregon Legislatures Have Recently Introuded Laws
Banning the Use of Deceptive Interrogation Techniques for
Juvenile Suspects
In 2021, Illinois became the first state legislature to pass a bill banning
law enforcement officers from using deceptive interrogation techniques with
juvenile suspects.141 The state bill became law on January 1, 2022, amending
the Criminal Procedure article of the Illinois Compiled Statutes by adding a
section that states:
An oral, written, or sign language confession of a minor, who at
the time of the commission of the offense was under 18 years of
age, made as a result of a custodial interrogation conducted at a
police station or other place of detention on or after the effective
date of this amendatory Act of the 102nd General Assembly shall
be presumed to be inadmissible as evidence against the minor
making the confession in a criminal proceeding or a juvenile court
proceeding for an act that if committed by an adult would be a
misdemeanor offense under Article 11 of the Criminal Code of
2012 or a felony offense under the Criminal Code of 2012 if,

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

See supra Section I.B.1.
MD. MODEL POLICIES, supra note 129, at 58–59.
MD. CODE ANN. CRIM. PROC. § 2-402 (2022).
See infra Section II.B.2.
MD. CODE ANN. CRIM. PROC. § 2-108 (2022).
See infra Section II.B.2.
Bill Status of SB2122, supra note 16.
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during the custodial interrogation, a law enforcement officer or
juvenile officer knowingly engages in deception.142
The bill defines “deception” as “the knowing communication of false
facts about evidence or unauthorized statements regarding leniency by a law
enforcement officer or juvenile officer to a subject of custodial
interrogation.”143 Additionally, the new section of the Code will go on to
state that “[t]he presumption of inadmissibility . . . may be overcome by a
preponderance of the evidence that the confession was voluntarily given,
based on a totality of the circumstances,” and will put the burden of proof on
the State.144
Shortly thereafter, Oregon passed a similar bill, enacting a law that
states:
A statement made by a person during a custodial interview
conducted by a peace officer is presumed to be involuntary if the
person is under 18 years of age and the statement is made in
connection with an investigation into a misdemeanor or a felony,
or an allegation that the person being interviewed committed an act
that, if committed by an adult would constitute a misdemeanor or
a felony, and the court determines that the peace officer
intentionally used information known by the officer to be false to
elicit the statement. This presumption may be overcome if the state
proves by clear and convincing evidence that the statement was
voluntary and not made in response to the false information used
by the peace officer to elicit the statement.145
Both statutes show an awareness of the cognitive and developmental
differences between juveniles and adults that warrant the implementation of
different interrogation tactics for juvenile suspects.146 Additionally, both
statutes introduce a presumption of inadmissibility.147 These provisions
mean that all confessions made by juveniles based on deception during an
interrogation will be deemed involuntary and thus inadmissible as evidence,
unless the state can meet its burden of proof in showing that the confession
was not coerced in any way and was, in fact, given voluntarily.148
The rulings by the Supreme Court of the United States and the Maryland
appellate courts demonstrate an understanding of the dangers posed by

142. S.B. 2122, 102nd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2021).
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. S.B. 418, 81st Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2021).
146. See infra Section II.A.
147. S.B. 2122, 102nd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2021); S.B. 418, 81st Leg. Assemb., Reg.
Sess. (Or. 2021).
148. S.B. 2122, 102nd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2021); S.B. 418, 81st Leg. Assemb., Reg.
Sess. (Or. 2021).
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deceptive and coercive interrogation techniques when a suspect relies on the
false statements made by officers in producing a confession.149 This danger
is greater for juveniles because law enforcement interrogation trainings, like
the Reid Technique, and the policies implemented by the Maryland Police
and Correctional Training Commissions do not give much consideration to
juvenile suspects.150 The Maryland General Assembly has not yet seriously
considered implementation of a law banning the use of deceptive techniques
when interrogating juvenile suspects.151
II. ANALYSIS
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects citizens
against self-incrimination.152 The right against self-incrimination was the
driving force in the Supreme Court mandating that all criminal suspects be
read their Miranda rights prior to interrogation.153 By utilizing deceptive
interrogation techniques that intimidate, confuse, or overwhelm juvenile
suspects, law enforcement officers are infringing on juveniles’ constitutional
protection against self-incrimination by coercing confessions of guilt.154
Unfortunately, these techniques then lead to false confessions and wrongful
convictions of juveniles.155
The frequency of wrongful convictions in the American justice system
became evident in the late 1980s following the widespread adoption of DNA
testing and evidence across the country’s law enforcement agencies.156 The
first exoneration based on the use of DNA evidence to prove a wrongful
conviction took place in 1989, and since then at least 375 people have been
exonerated due to DNA evidence.157 Records of these exonerations have
shown that approximately 29% of the exonerees provided false
confessions.158 Strikingly, 31% of these exonerees who gave false
149. See supra Section I.A.1 and I.C.1.
150. See supra Section I.A.2 and I.C.2.
151. See infra Section II.B.
152. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
153. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966) (stating that, should an interrogation proceed
without the suspect exercising the right to remain silent or to have an attorney present, “a heavy
burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently
waived his privilege against self-incrimination”).
154. See infra Section II.A.1.
155. See infra Section II.A.
156. Tonja Jacobi, Miranda 2.0, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 9 n.30 (2016).
157. DNA
Exonerations
in
the
United
States,
INNOCENCE
PROJECT,
https://innocenceproject.org/dna-exonerations-in-the-united-states/ (last visited Feb. 12, 2022). Of
the 375 exonerees, the average age at the time of wrongful conviction was 26.6 years old and the
average number of years served was fourteen. Id. Twenty-one of these individuals served time on
death row. Id.
158. Id.

1102

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 81:1084

confessions were eighteen or younger at the time,159 reflecting a large
disparity as individuals under the age of eighteen make up only about 7% of
arrests.160
Considering the heightened rate of false confessions among juveniles,
this Comment will explain why the Maryland General Assembly must
implement statutory protections for juvenile suspects that ban the use of
deceptive interrogation techniques when interrogating juveniles to protect
juveniles’ Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. Section II.A
will analyze the specific concerns for juveniles in the context of false
confessions and the likely reasons behind the prevalence of false confessions
among juvenile suspects.161 Next, Section II.B will identify deficiencies in
Maryland’s current interrogation standards and police policies, highlighting
specific provisions that raise concern for juvenile interrogation, and will
analyze proposed legislation in Maryland.162 Section II.C will introduce a
model statute for the Maryland General Assembly that bans police use of
deceptive interrogation techniques with juvenile suspects and requires law
enforcement to adopt training guidelines for non-deceptive techniques to use
in juvenile interrogations.163
A. Juveniles Are Highly Susceptible to Deceptive Interrogation
Techniques and Are More Likely than Adults to Produce a False
Confession
While people of all ages have been shown to provide false confessions
during interrogations, juvenile suspects are more likely to do so and thus
experience a heightened risk of wrongful conviction.164 Juveniles are two to
three times more likely to enter a false confession than adults.165 In one study
of 340 exonerations in the United States, 42% of the exonerees who were
arrested as juveniles had falsely confessed, compared to only 13% of the
exonerees who were arrested as adults.166 This disparity can be largely
explained by the fact that, despite the psychological and developmental

159. Id.
160. OFF. OF JUV. JUST. & DELINQ. PREVENTION, DEP’T OF JUST., STATISTICAL BRIEFING
BOOK: ESTIMATED NUMBER OF ARRESTS BY OFFENSE AND AGE GROUP, 2019 (2020),
https://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/crime/ucr.asp?table_in=1.
161. See infra Section II.A.
162. See infra Section II.B.
163. See infra Section II.C.
164. Steven A. Drizin & Greg Luloff, Are Juvenile Courts a Breeding Ground for Wrongful
Convictions?, 34 N. KY. L. REV. 257, 259–60 (2007).
165. Crane et al., supra note 10, at 12.
166. Id.
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differences between juveniles and adults,167 the same specific techniques are
used for all interrogations.168
1. The Developmental Differences Between Juveniles and Adults
Exhibit a Need for Unique Interrogation Strategies for Juveniles
and Explain the Potential Reasoning Behind the Heightened Rate
of False Confessions Among Juvenile Suspects
The prefrontal cortex of the brain “controls judgment, problem-solving,
and decision-making,” and aids in regulation of impulsive behaviors.169 This
portion of the brain does not fully develop until people reach their earlytwenties, leading to traits such as “impulsivity, vulnerability to pressure and
suggestibility, as well as a tendency to be motivated by short-term rewards”
among teenagers and young adults.170 Furthermore, juveniles are more
vulnerable to external influences and unable to fully assess risks as compared
to adults.171 These traits may not always be immediately evident to adults
who interact with juveniles, especially because older teenagers often have
fully developed cognitive thinking abilities.172 However, such traits cause
juveniles to be more likely to break under the pressure of an interrogation and
tell the questioning officer what the juvenile believes the officer wants to
hear.173 For example, a juvenile suspect who wants a stressful interrogation
to end and who is not fully able to grasp the long-term consequences and
risks associated with confessing to a crime may falsely confess simply to
achieve that short-term reward.
Furthermore, juveniles are more likely than adults to waive their
Miranda rights.174 One reason may be that juveniles often either
misunderstand or fail to fully grasp the meanings of such rights,175 especially
the right to remain silent and the right to have an attorney present during an
interrogation.176 A common explanation given by juveniles who provide
false confessions is the belief that, if they confess to the crime of which they
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

See infra Section II.A.1.
See infra Section II.A.2.
Crane et al., supra note 10, at 12.
Id.
Id. at 14.
Barry C. Feld, Behind Closed Doors: What Really Happens When Cops Question Kids, 23
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 395, 405 (2013) [hereinafter Feld, Behind Closed Doors].
173. Barry C. Feld, Police Interrogation of Juveniles: An Empirical Study of Policy and Practice,
97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 219, 244 (2006) [hereinafter Feld, Police Interrogation].
174. Feld, Behind Closed Doors, supra note 172, at 429.
175. Caitlyn Wigler, Comment, Juvenile Due Process: Applying Contract Principles to Ensure
Voluntary Criminal Confessions, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 1425, 1438 (2020).
176. Jennifer J. Walters, Comment, Illinois’ Weakened Attempt to Prevent False Confessions by
Juveniles: The Requirement of Counsel for the Interrogations of Some Juveniles, 33 LOY. U. CHI.
L.J. 487, 506 (2002).
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are accused, they will be able to go home.177 According to studies focusing
on the comprehension of Miranda rights, the main factor in determining how
well a person understands these rights is their age.178
Juveniles are singled out in various other legal contexts across the
country, yet they are grouped with adults for criminal interrogation purposes.
For example, minors cannot vote in elections,179 file lawsuits,180 be employed
beyond specific limitations,181 be sentenced to death,182 be sentenced to life
in prison without possibility of parole under a mandatory sentencing
policy,183 or be sentenced to life in prison without possibility of parole in nonmurder crimes.184 In most cases, juveniles cannot be legally bound by
contracts,185 consent to certain medical treatments,186 or be legally married.187
However, this recognition that juveniles are not equivalent to adults in terms
of legal rights does not carry over into the context of criminal interrogation
under current Maryland law.

177. Drizin & Leo, supra note 14, at 969.
178. Sam Yousif, Protecting Justice: Juveniles and the Coercive Environment of Police
Interrogations, 95 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 517, 526 (2018) (citing Thomas Grisso, Juveniles’
Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights: An Empirical Analysis, 68 CAL. L. REV. 1134, 1159 (1980)).
179. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1 (stating that citizens ages eighteen and older can vote
in elections).
180. See, e.g., Stephanie Rabiner, Why Can’t Minors File Lawsuits?, FINDLAW (Apr. 27, 2012,
9:45 AM), https://www.findlaw.com/legalblogs/personal-injury/why-cant-minors-file-lawsuits/
(stating that both federal and state laws generally prohibit minors from filing a lawsuit on his/her
own behalf).
181. See, e.g., WAGE & HOUR DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., CHILD LABOR PROVISIONS OF THE
FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT (FLSA) FOR NONAGRICULTURAL OCCUPATIONS (2016) (explaining
the FLSA’s limitations on employment of minors); 29 C.F.R. § 570.2(a)(ii) (2022) (stating that
minors cannot be employed in any position listed as hazardous).
182. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573–75 (2005) (holding that it is unconstitutional to apply
the death penalty to a juvenile as such a punishment violates the Eighth Amendment).
183. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 470 (2012) (holding that a mandatory sentence of life in
prison without parole for a juvenile is unconstitutional as it violates the Eighth Amendment).
184. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74 (2010) (holding that a juvenile who committed a nonhomicide offense cannot be sentenced to life in prison without parole).
185. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN. COM. LAW § 1-103(c)(1) (2022) (stating that the “age of majority
as it pertains to the capacity to contract is 18 years of age”). The age of majority is eighteen in all
states except for Alabama (nineteen), Nebraska (nineteen), and Mississippi (twenty-one). Elissa
Suh, The Age of Majority (and the UTMA Account Distribution Age) in Every State, POLICYGENIUS
(Dec. 1, 2021), https://www.policygenius.com/estate-planning/age-of-majority-by-state/.
186. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN. HEALTH–GEN. § 20-102 (2022) (specifying the limited
circumstances under which a minor has the right to consent to or deny medical treatment for
him/herself).
187. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN. FAM. LAW § 2-301 (2022) (stating that individuals under the age
of fifteen may not marry, individuals who are fifteen may only marry if they have guardian consent
and one of the juveniles is pregnant or has given birth, and individuals who are sixteen, or seventeen
years old may only marry with guardian consent or if one of the juveniles is pregnant or has given
birth).
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In 2011, the Supreme Court acknowledged the effect of age and
development on the experience of juvenile suspects in J.D.B. v. North
Carolina.188 There, the Court explicitly recognized that the law differentiates
juveniles from adults and determined that age must be considered when
evaluating whether a suspect is in custody under the Miranda analysis.189
The opinion acknowledged the fact that the risk of false confessions is higher
for juvenile suspects, implying that law enforcement officers should take this
fact into consideration during interrogations.190
2. The Same Interrogation Techniques Are Used when Questioning
Juveniles and Adults
Research indicates that law enforcement officers are willing to adopt
standard procedures for juvenile interrogations—which could include
developmentally sensitive interrogation techniques—but their current
training techniques do not provide them with the resources to do so.191 For
instance, the Reid Technique includes two general types of tactics:
maximization and minimization.192 Maximization techniques attempt to
maximize the seriousness of the situation the interrogation subject is in, such
as by introducing false evidence or utilizing scare tactics (e.g., discussing the
harsh conditions of prison).193 Minimization techniques attempt to minimize
the seriousness of the situation in an effort to coerce the subject to confess,
such as by downplaying the gravity of the crime, empathizing with the
subject, and offering justifications for the crime.194 In other words,
maximization techniques aim to convince suspects of the “futility of denial,”
while minimization techniques aim to provide a “moral justification[]” strong
enough to convince the suspect to confess.195 The Reid Technique was
designed to be used when interrogating adults and does not discourage law
enforcement officers from using maximization and minimization techniques
when questioning juveniles; it simply urges the questioning officers to use

188. 564 U.S. 261 (2011).
189. See id. at 277 ( “[W]e hold that so long as the child’s age was known to the officer at the
time of police questioning, or would have been objectively apparent to a reasonable officer, its
inclusion in the custody analysis is consistent with the objective nature of that test.”).
190. Id. at 269 (stating that the risk of false confessions is “more troubling” and “more acute”
for juveniles).
191. See Jessica O. Kostelnik & N. Dickon Reppucci, Reid Training and Sensitivity to
Developmental Maturity in Interrogation: Results from a National Survey of Police, 27 BEHAV.
SCIS. & L. 361, 365–66, 375–76 (2009).
192. Saul M. Kassin, The Psychology of Confession Evidence, 52 AM. PSYCH. 221, 223 (1997).
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Feld, Police Interrogation, supra note 173, at 261.
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caution.196 In one study, researchers found that police officers utilized
maximization techniques frequently with juveniles: The officers accused
juvenile suspects of lying 49% of the time, urged them to tell the truth 45%
of the time, disputed their asserted innocence 40% of the time, “played on
their fears” 36% of the time, and “emphasized the seriousness of their
predicament” 34% of the time.197 The officers utilized minimization
techniques slightly more frequently with the juvenile suspects: The officers
described scenarios or themes in an attempt to reduce the suspect’s feelings
of guilt 50% of the time, expressed empathy 42% of the time, and minimized
the seriousness of the crime 38% of the time.198
A research study comparing police officers trained in the Reid
Technique and officers not trained in the Reid Technique found that Reidtrained officers were less sensitive to the developmental differences between
adolescents and adults than non-Reid-trained officers.199 The data from this
study indicates that Reid-trained officers “perceive[d] adolescents to be as
mature as adults and treat them as such during interrogation.”200 However,
more than half of both the Reid-trained and non-Reid-trained officers
expressed interest in receiving training on techniques specifically for juvenile
interrogations.201 The findings of this study suggest that, although officers
are willing to incorporate standard procedures for juvenile interrogations, the
training programs they attend lack such information, and therefore they use
the same interrogation tactics for both adults and juveniles.
B. While the Maryland Judiciary Has Acknowledged the Need for
Sensitivity when Interrogating Juvenile Suspects, the Legislature
and Police Policies Have Not Adopted Specific Provisions
Regarding Limited Interrogation Tactics or Developmentally
Sensitive Techniques
In several cases, the Court of Appeals of Maryland202 has ruled that a
confession was given involuntarily due to false promises made by police, or
due in part to a lack of consideration for the juvenile’s age.203 While the
Maryland General Assembly has enacted some laws designed to ensure that
confessions given during interrogation are voluntary, it has not implemented

196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

Kostelnik & Reppucci, supra note 191, at 365–66.
Feld, Police Interrogation, supra note 173, at 263.
Id. at 278.
Kostelnik & Reppucci, supra note 191, at 374.
Id.
Id. at 375–76.
The Maryland Court of Appeals is the highest state appellate court in Maryland.
See infra Section II.B.1.
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any significant limitations on juvenile interrogations.204 However, the 2022
Maryland State Senate has passed a bill requiring law enforcement officers
to provide actual notice to the parent or guardian of a juvenile who is arrested
and requires juvenile suspects to consult with an attorney before an
interrogation begins.205 Furthermore, the Maryland Police and Correctional
Training Commissions do not provide specific guidelines for interrogating
juveniles in a developmentally sensitive way.206 There is a need for action
by the Maryland state legislature because the state courts have not clearly
denounced the use of deceptive techniques for juveniles,207 the existing
legislation does not restrict the types of permissible interrogation
techniques,208 and the training policies for law enforcement across the state
do not provide guidance specific to juvenile interrogations.209
1. The Maryland Courts Have Repeatedly Expressed a Concern for
the Voluntariness of Confessions Coerced Through the Use of
Deceptive Interrogation Techniques and Have Denounced the
General Use of Making False Promises During Interrogations
The Maryland Court of Appeals has relied on the two-pronged Hillard
test in consideration of the voluntariness of a coerced confession: (1) whether
the suspect was falsely promised leniency or another benefit in exchange for
a confession; and (2) whether such false promises directly induced the
confession given.210 The Hillard test does not stem from a case involving a
juvenile, however, the test does extend to juvenile suspects and can be
especially useful in showing that coerced juvenile confessions are
involuntary when applied in conjunction with the totality of the
circumstances standard of analysis from State v. Hill.211 The Court of
Appeals has repeatedly held that the voluntariness of any confession must be
analyzed within the context of the totality of the circumstances, which

204. See infra Section II.B.2.
205. S.B. 53, 2022 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2022). This bill was vetoed by the Maryland
Governor, but the veto was then overridden by both chambers of the General Assembly. Id.
206. See infra Section II.B.2.
207. See infra Section II.B.1.
208. See infra Section II.B.2.
209. See infra Section II.B.3.
210. See, e.g., Hillard v. State, 286 Md. 145, 153, 406 A.2d 415, 420 (1979) (stating that “under
Maryland criminal law . . . if an accused is told, or it is implied, that making an inculpatory
statement will be to his advantage . . . and he makes remarks in reliance on that inducement, his
declaration will be considered to have been involuntarily made and therefore inadmissible”);
Winder v. State, 362 Md. 275, 309–21, 765 A.2d 97, 115–22 (2001) (applying the Hillard test to
determine that the defendant’s confession was not given voluntarily).
211. 2 Md. App. 594, 601, 236 A.2d 27, 30 (1967) (stating that “the standard by which the
admissibility of [the defendant’s] . . . statement is to be measured is whether, under the totality of
all the attendant circumstances, the statement was given freely and voluntarily”).
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include the subject’s age, mental capacity, physical condition, experience,
and suggestibility.212 Factors such as age, mental capacity, and experience
directly affect a person’s likelihood of being induced to provide a
confession.213 Thus, although the state courts have not prohibited deceptive
interrogation techniques for juvenile suspects, the analysis for voluntariness
of a confession applied by the courts implicitly acknowledges the need for
developmentally sensitive interrogation techniques in order for a juvenile’s
confession to be considered valid.214
The existing case law alone is insufficient to push law enforcement
officers in Maryland to abandon the use of deceptive interrogation techniques
for juvenile suspects. The case law largely focuses on the use of false
promises by questioning officers,215 which is only one of many deceptive
interrogation techniques.216 Additionally, the case law does not provide
guidance on other, non-deceptive techniques that law enforcement officers
can implement in place of the deceptive tactics currently being widely
used.217 Such guidance would more appropriately fall within the duties of
the state legislature, which oversees the Maryland Police and Correctional
Training Commissions.218
2. Maryland Laws Limit the Production and Admission of False
Confessions but Do Little to Directly Address the Interrogation
Techniques Used for Juvenile Suspects
One significant statute aimed at reducing the number of false
confessions is the requirement that custodial interrogations be electronically
recorded.219 The implementation of a mandatory recording policy benefits
all parties involved in an interrogation. Officers are less likely to use
improper interrogation techniques when they know a permanent record is

212. See, e.g., Lodowski v. State, 307 Md. 233, 254–58, 513 A.2d 299, 310–13 (1986) (finding
that the totality of the circumstances surrounding the confession led to the conclusion that the
confession was involuntary); Winder, 362 Md. at 307, 765 A.2d at 114 (holding that a court must
look at the totality of the circumstances of an interrogation in order to determine whether a
confession was voluntary).
213. See supra Section II.A.
214. See, e.g., Streams v. State, 238 Md. 278, 281–82, 208 A.2d 614, 615 (1965) (holding that
the defendant’s eighth grade education level was a significant factor in determining that the
deceptive techniques used by officers induced the defendant’s confession); Bean v. State, 234 Md.
432, 450–51, 199 A.2d 773, 782–83 (1964) (Prescott, J., dissenting) (arguing that a fifteen-year-old
should not be held to the same standards of maturity and understanding as an adult).
215. See supra Section I (explaining Maryland case law on this subject).
216. See supra Section II.A.2.
217. See supra Section I.C.1.
218. Maryland Police and Correctional Training Commissions, MD. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY &
CORR. SERVS., https://www.dpscs.state.md.us/agencies/mpctc.shtml (last visited Oct. 28, 2021).
219. MD. CODE ANN. CRIM. PROC. § 2-402 (2022).

2022]

THE KIDS AREN’T ALRIGHT

1109

being made of their actions during interrogation, and they are also protected
from potential false claims by a suspect that such improper techniques were
used.220 After surveying detectives in over 460 departments across the
country, including many in Maryland, one report found that none of the
detectives would choose to return to non-recorded interrogations.221
Maryland law requires police officers in the state to take reasonable
steps to notify a juvenile’s parent or legal guardian upon charging or arresting
the juvenile.222 If an officer arrests a juvenile, they must make a “reasonable
attempt” to notify the juvenile’s parent or guardian within forty-eight hours
of taking the juvenile into custody.223 Although this statute sought to provide
protections for juveniles, it does not specify what constitutes a “reasonable
attempt” to notify.224 Allowing room for discretion is undoubtedly necessary
in such policies in order to allow trained and experienced officers to apply
their knowledge and expertise to individual, unique cases and contexts that
are unforeseen by the legislature. However, the requirement of making a
“reasonable attempt” to contact a person in the modern era is vague. Would
a reasonable attempt end with a phone call being sent to voicemail? Or, does
it require an officer to travel to the known residence to find the person? Is a
busier officer with a heavy caseload allowed to exercise less effort than an
officer with little on their schedule for the day? What should an officer do if
the juvenile does not know the contact information for their parent or
guardian?
The 2021 Maryland General Assembly considered a bill titled the
“Juvenile Interrogation Protection Act” that would require parental
notification and allow a juvenile to consult with an attorney prior to
interrogations, improving upon the “reasonable attempt” requirement to
provide parental notice that is currently in place.225 The bill passed in the
House of Delegates and was brought to the Senate Judicial Proceedings
Committee, but was never debated and thus did not proceed to a vote.226 A
similar bill, titled the Child Interrogation Protection Act, has been passed by
the 2022 Maryland General Assembly.227 The Child Interrogation Protection
220. Tom Sullivan, Justice Prevails with Recorded Interrogations, BALT. SUN (Mar. 26, 2006,
12:00 PM), https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/bs-xpm-2006-03-26-0603260024-story.html.
221. Id.
222. CRIM. PROC. § 2-108.
223. Id. § 2-108(b).
224. Id. § 2-108.
225. H.B. 315, 2021 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2021).
226. SB0136,
M D.
GEN.
ASSEMBLY,
https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/mgawebsite/Legislation/Details/SB0136?ys=2021RS&search=True
(last visited Apr. 13, 2022). The House Judiciary Committee and the Senate Judicial Proceedings
Committee heard a similar bill in 2020, but no further actions were taken. H.B. 624, 2020 Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2020).
227. H.B. 269, 2022 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2022).
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Act is broad as to the specific rules and requirements the sponsors would like
the General Assembly to adopt, stating that the Act is to establish the
following:
[C]ertain requirements for taking a child into custody,
interrogating a child, or charging a child with a criminal violation,
including notice requirements, requirements for consultation with
an attorney, and requirements for the maintenance of certain
records; authorizing the Court of Appeals to adopt certain rules
relating to the advisement of a child of certain rights; establishing
a certain rebuttable presumption that a statement made by a child
during an interrogation is inadmissible under certain
circumstances; requiring the Office of the Public Defender to
develop and implement certain policies and to publish on its
website or make available to law enforcement certain information;
and generally relating to juvenile law and the interrogation of
children by law enforcement.228
The 2022 bill uses broader language than the 2021 bill, which does not
include several specific provisions that the 2021 bill included, such as those
regarding attorney consultations with juvenile suspects and requirements for
the Police Training and Standards Commission to “adopt certain rules
relating to the advisement of a child of certain rights.”229 Having passed in
the General Assembly, the Child Interrogation Protection Act will lead
Maryland to join a few other states that already have laws requiring the
presence of either a parent, guardian, or attorney during an interrogation in
efforts to provide protections for juveniles’ rights during questioning.230 The
Child Interrogation Protection Act does offer some protections for juvenile
suspects, such as the suggestion to the Court of Appeals of Maryland to
“adopt rules concerning age-appropriate language to be used to advise a child
who is taken into custody of the child’s rights.”231 The bill also prohibits law
enforcement officers from interrogating a child unless the child has
“consulted with an attorney” and a reasonable effort has been made to “give
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-2-511(1) (West 2022) (declaring that “[n]o
statements or admissions of a juvenile made as a result of the custodial interrogation of such juvenile
by a law enforcement official concerning delinquent acts alleged to have been committed by the
juvenile shall be admissible in evidence against such juvenile unless a parent, guardian, or legal or
physical custodian of the juvenile was present at such interrogation and . . . were advised of the
juvenile’s [Miranda rights]”); Elizabeth Weill-Greenberg, Children Can Be on Their Own when
Grilled By Police.
The Push for Protection is Growing, APPEAL (Mar. 25, 2021),
https://theappeal.org/juvenile-right-to-attorney-police-interrogation-maryland-state-legislation/
(explaining that California recently enacted legislation requiring the presence of an attorney during
juvenile interrogations and that state legislatures in Washington and New York considered similar
bills in 2021).
231. H.B. 269, 2022 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2022).
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actual notice to the parent, guardian, or custodian of the child that the child
will be interrogated.”232 Under this bill, the right to counsel may not be
waived by a child, and all requirements within the bill must be followed
unless the child is reasonably thought to have information regarding a threat
to public safety.233 These protections are undeniably beneficial for juveniles
in Maryland, but a more robust statute that explicitly requires abandonment
of deceptive interrogation techniques is necessary to fully account for the
developmental differences and needs of juveniles.
3. Maryland Police Policies Provide Little Guidance on Procedures
for Interrogating Juvenile Suspects
The Model Policies for Law Enforcement in Maryland, published by the
Maryland Police and Correctional Training Commissions, provide guiding
principles to law enforcement officers for interviews and interrogations and
include a section regarding juvenile subjects.234 The Model Policies state that
“[o]fficers have no authority to offer promises of leniency or special
consideration as inducements for admissions or cooperation,”235 reflecting
the Maryland Court of Appeals’ holding that a confession induced by false
promises during interrogation is involuntary and inadmissible.236 The section
titled “Special Cases – Juveniles” is especially brief, listing only three
specific provisions.237 First, the Model Policies state that juveniles have the
same rights as adults under Miranda.238 While a juvenile suspect may choose
to waive these rights, interrogating officers should keep in mind that the
voluntariness of any subsequent statement will be analyzed based on several
factors including age, experience, capacity to understand the Miranda rights
and the effects of waiving such rights, and the presence of a parent or legal
guardian during the interrogation.239 Second, the Model Policies advise
officers to tell a juvenile that they can speak to their parents or guardians
upon arrest, even though this is not a strict requirement.240 The Model
Policies reference In re Lucas F.,241 stating that “at least one Maryland court
has held that a 10-year old is entitled to parental guidance.”242 Finally, the
Policies instruct that juvenile interrogations should be limited in time, include
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.

Id.
Id.
MD. MODEL POLICIES, supra note 129, at 56–59.
Id. at 58.
See supra Section II.B.1.
MD. MODEL POLICIES, supra note 129, at 58–59.
Id. at 58.
Id.
Id. at 58–59.
68 Md. App. 97, 510 A.2d 270 (1986); see supra Section I.C.1.
MD. MODEL POLICIES, supra note 129, at 58–59.
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breaks from questioning, and involve only a limited number of officers in the
interrogation.243 This completes the Policies’ section on juvenile cases, with
no additional guidance for interrogation of juveniles.244
In 2019, there were 18,822 juveniles aged ten to seventeen arrested in
Maryland.245 This number of juvenile arrests justifies and signifies a need
for guidance on interrogation techniques officers should use when
interrogating juveniles. Similar to the Reid Technique,246 there is currently
no differentiation between the techniques used to interrogate juveniles and
techniques used to interrogate adults in the Policies.247 Introducing and
implementing developmentally sensitive interrogation tactics for juvenile
suspects will require training and guidance for law enforcement officers.
C. The Maryland Legislature Should Adopt a Statute Banning the Use
of Deceptive Techniques in Juvenile Interrogations and Should
Implement Guidance for Using Developmentally Sensitive
Interrogation Techniques
In order to protect juveniles’ Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination, the Maryland legislature must implement statutory protections
for juvenile suspects by banning the use of deceptive interrogation techniques
when interviewing juveniles. Such legislation will create a more efficient
and just system by reducing the rate of false confessions and wrongful
convictions.248 Therefore, the expenditure of resources on wrongful
convictions will be reduced and more resources will be directed towards
convicting individuals who are guilty of a crime, benefitting the entire
institution of law enforcement. Aiming to produce an effective change in the
interrogation experience of juvenile suspects, this Comment proposes two
actions by the Maryland General Assembly: first, a statute that bans the use
of deception during juvenile interrogations, similar to those recently passed
in Illinois249 and Oregon;250 and second, a directive for the Maryland Police
and Correctional Training Commissions to produce and distribute guidance
and trainings on developmentally sensitive interrogation techniques to be
used in juvenile interrogations. Together, these two courses of action will
243. Id. at 59.
244. Id.
245. Juvenile
Arrests
in
Maryland,
KIDS
COUNT
DATA
https://datacenter.kidscount.org/data/tables/4461-juvenilearrests#detailed/2/any/false/1729,37,871,870,573,869,36,868,867,133/any/10020,15102
visited Feb. 19, 2022).
246. See supra Section I.A.2.
247. MD. MODEL POLICIES, supra note 129, at 56–59.
248. See supra notes 152–164 and accompanying text.
249. S.B. 2122, 102nd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2021).
250. S.B. 418, 81st Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2021).

CTR.,
(last
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work to protect the rights of juveniles from the ground floor by training law
enforcement officers in effective juvenile interrogation techniques, while
providing a method of recourse for juveniles to pursue if they are subject to
unfair interrogations by deeming confessions given during a deceptive
interrogation inadmissible.
1. The State Legislature Should Follow the Guidance of Illinois and
Oregon Statutes Banning the Use of Deception in Juvenile
Interrogations, with Slight Adjustments to Account for Potential
Procedural Shortfalls
The Maryland state legislature should adopt a statute that provides
recourse for juveniles who were subjected to a deceptive interrogation by
holding any confession induced by deception as inadmissible. One example
of a potential statute for consideration is as follows:
(a) Any law enforcement officer conducting an interview of a
juvenile, who is under eighteen years of age, in connection
with an investigation of an act that, if committed by an adult,
would constitute a crime, may not use deceit, trickery, or any
other misleading interrogation technique during the interview.
(b) A confession given by a juvenile resulting from an interview
in which the questioning officer uses deceit, trickery, or any
other misleading interrogation technique will be presumed to
be inadmissible as evidence against the juvenile.
(c) The presumption of inadmissibility of a confession of a
juvenile due to the use of deception may be overcome by a
preponderance of the evidence that, based on the totality of the
circumstances, the confession was given voluntarily. The
burden of proving the voluntariness of the confession will be
on the State.
This sample bill uses language from both the Illinois and Oregon bills
passed in 2021, while specifying certain terms of the new law. The language
in section (a) of the proposed bill is taken largely from the Oregon bill, with
slight grammatical edits and with a change from the words “a peace officer”
in the Oregon bill to “any law enforcement officer” in this proposed bill.251
This change is intended to ensure that interviews performed by school
resource officers are included. Additionally, the use of the word “interview,”
as opposed to “interrogation,” is important; this language is used to ensure
that the ban on deception is not limited to custodial interrogations following
an arrest but includes similar interviews conducted with a juvenile suspect
outside of a police station, such as those conducted by an officer on the
premises of the juvenile’s school.
251. S.B. 418, 81st Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2021).
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Section (b) of the proposed bill is modeled after section (c) of the Illinois
bill.252 This proposed section enforces the preceding section by declaring
that, should a questioning officer utilize deceptive interrogation techniques,
any confession obtained will thus be inadmissible as evidence. The
presumption is intended to remove the burden on a juvenile to prove
deception, and instead allow a judge to declare the confession inadmissible
upon review of the record of the interview. Therefore, even if a juvenile
defendant is unaware of the fact that they were deceived or does not have
knowledge of the law prohibiting such practices, the confession may still be
declared inadmissible.
Finally, section (c) of the proposed bill allows the prosecution to rebut
the presumption that the confession was involuntary due to deception. This
section largely reflects portions of sections (c) and (d) of the Illinois bill.253
The consideration of “the totality of the circumstances”254 is included in the
Illinois bill, but also reflects the Maryland courts’ analysis when determining
the voluntariness of confessions.255 This provision gives the prosecution the
opportunity to convince the judge that the confession should be admitted if
the context of the case demonstrates that the confession was voluntary and
not induced by deceptive questioning.
2. The State Legislature Should Direct the Maryland Police and
Correctional Training Commission to Create and Implement
Guidance and Training on Developmentally Appropriate
Interrogation Techniques for Juvenile Suspects, Modeled After the
PEACE Method
The Maryland Police and Correctional Training Commissions produce
the Model Policies for Law Enforcement in Maryland,256 which should
include developmentally sensitive interrogation techniques for juveniles.
One popular example of a non-deceptive interrogation strategy is the PEACE
method.257 The PEACE method is a five-step interrogation process: planning
and preparation, engage and explain, account (clarification and challenge),
closure, and evaluation.258 Developed with reliance on research of interview
psychology,259 the PEACE method relies on scientifically based techniques
252. S.B. 2122, 102nd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2021).
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. See infra Section II.B.1.
256. Maryland Police and Correctional Training Commissions, supra note 218.
257. Mary Schollum, Bringing PEACE to the United States: A Framework for Investigative
Interviewing, POLICE CHIEF MAG., Nov. 2017, at 30.
258. Id. at 32.
259. See id. at 32 (listing four of the main influential resources relied upon by the United
Kingdom when creating the PEACE method). It is important to compare the support of empirical
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in order to “obtain accurate, relevant, and complete accounts from those
being interviewed.”260 As of late-2017, the PEACE method was being
practiced by law enforcement in the United Kingdom, Australia, New
Zealand, Norway, and parts of Canada, among others.261 In the United
Kingdom, where the PEACE method originated, the country’s legislation
requires officers to use the PEACE method when conducting
interrogations.262 The United Kingdom government also provides a guiding
publication that details best-practice interview techniques that is referenced
nationally.263
Interviews conducted using the PEACE method follow the same basic
structure.264 First, the questioning officer will prepare for the interview by
reviewing background information and available evidence, and setting goals
for the interview.265 Next, the questioning officer will establish rapport with
the subject266 and explain the format and process of the interview that is about
to proceed.267 The questioning officer then gets the subject’s full account of
the events in question using open-ended questions268 and techniques “such as
active listening, use of pauses and silence, body language, different types of
questions, memory jogs, seating arrangements” and others.269 Afterwards,
the questioning officer will recount the interview to the subject, ask the
subject to confirm the accuracy of the information relayed back to them, and
research that backs the PEACE method to the Reid Technique, which was created by “authors with
no empirical authority . . . lacks supporting experimental data, and . . . is not recognized by the
scientific community. Yet . . . observations by Reid are evidently the only prerequisites necessary
to create [the Reid Technique] training empire . . . .” Gallini, supra note 56, at 565.
260. See Schollum, supra note 257, at 32 (“[Techniques] include free recall (FR), the enhanced
cognitive interview (ECI), and conversation management (CM).”). Note the difference between the
PEACE method’s goal of obtaining a true account of the facts and the current policies “designed to
elicit incriminating responses” within the model interrogation policies distributed in Maryland. MD.
MODEL POLICIES, supra note 129, at 56. Obtaining a true account of the facts should not be
conflated with obtaining a confession, as these two goals lead to different interview outcomes. See
supra notes 130–132 and accompanying text.
261. Schollum, supra note 257, at 33.
262. See id. at 34 (referencing the document Achieving Best Evidence in Criminal Proceedings
that provides guidance on interview techniques).
263. See id. (referencing the legislative provision in the United Kingdom that “sets out the
requirements for the detention, treatment, and questioning of suspects”).
264. Id. at 33.
265. Id.
266. See id. (explaining that establishing rapport is one of the most important parts of an
interview and is often done by “showing kindness and respect; identifying and meeting basic needs;
being patient; asking how the interviewee wants to be addressed; finding common ground or shared
experiences; showing concern for the interviewee and his or her situation; using similar language
as the interviewee; and employing active listening skills”).
267. Id. Additionally, the explanation stage can reveal important factors that may then affect the
course of the interview, such as comprehension abilities or communication barriers. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 32.
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then explain the next steps in the process for the subject.270 Finally, the
questioning officer reviews the results of the interview, determines whether
the original goals for the interview were met, “reviews the investigation in
the light of information obtained,” and reflects upon their conduct during the
interview and considers any possible improvements for future interviews.271
As opposed to the Reid Technique and deceptive interrogation methods
that aim to elicit confessions,272 the PEACE method is designed to draw out
factual information from a suspect, which may or may not include a
confession.273 There has been no evidence that the PEACE method has a
lower confession rate than the more aggressive Reid Technique or similar
confrontational methods.274 One of the most important aspects of the PEACE
method is the introduction of the method to officers over the course of a
“tiered approach” training.275 The tiered approach was implemented in
response to concerns about the amount of information that officers were
expected to master after attending a relatively short training.276 It is
mandatory that all new police officers complete the first tier of training within
eighteen days; officers then complete additional tiers depending on the course
and progression of their career.277
A shift away from aggressive and deceptive interrogation techniques
does not mean that interrogations will be any less effective at eliciting
confessions.278 Research into the effectiveness of deceptive techniques is
“ultimately inconclusive.”279 Such research shows that deceptive techniques
can elicit false confessions “and there are reasons to believe that alternatives
may produce fewer false confessions.”280 One 1989 study found that a
similar shift in technique in the United Kingdom did not cause any decline in
confession rates, and a 2003 study found that the United Kingdom had a
higher confession rate than the United States, indicating that more cases are

270. Id. at 33.
271. Id.
272. See supra Section I.A.2 (providing background on the Reid Technique).
273. Schollum, supra note 257, at 31–33.
274. Andrew J. Greer, Note, Oh, The Places You’ll Go! — Prison: How False Evidence in
Juvenile Interrogations Unconstitutionally Coerces False Confessions, 10 DREXEL L. REV. 741,
769–70 (2018).
275. Schollum, supra note 257, at 32.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 34. As officers progress in their careers and move up the chain of command, gaining
responsibilities and influence, they are able and encouraged to attend additional interrogation
training in order to become a lead interrogator. Id.
278. Id. at 33. Research has shown that the PEACE method “results in a similar rate of
confessions as interrogational interviews, even though confessions are not the primary aim.” Id.
279. Julia Simon-Kerr, Public Trust and Police Deception, 11 NE. U. L. REV. 625, 631 (2019).
280. Id.
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being solved.281 Notably, confessions that are elicited from an individual
using the PEACE method are “more likely to be true confessions than those
arising from interrogational interviews.”282 For this reason, the Maryland
legislature should require the Training Commissions to implement
interrogation techniques similar to the PEACE method when interrogating
juvenile suspects.
CONCLUSION
The Maryland General Assembly should take action to protect
juveniles’ constitutional right against self-incrimination by enacting
legislation that bans the use of deceptive techniques in juvenile interrogations
and requires Maryland law enforcement to implement new interrogation
techniques for juvenile suspects. State case law and current interrogation
policies in Maryland recognize the need for consideration of a juvenile
suspect’s age and developmental cognitive ability during interrogation, but
they do not provide direction on how law enforcement officers can tailor
interrogation methods to account for the developmental stage of juveniles.283
The General Assembly should take inspiration from the recent laws passed
in Illinois and Oregon.284 Additionally, the General Assembly should direct
Maryland law enforcement to adopt a more developmentally sensitive
interrogation technique for juveniles, such as the PEACE method or a similar
set of tactics that do not implement deception or rely on aggressive
interviewing styles.285 A statewide ban on deceptive techniques and
widespread adoption of a developmentally sensitive interrogation technique
would work in tandem to ensure that juvenile suspects are not being coerced
or falling victim to psychological tactics designed to elicit a confession.
Instead, juveniles would be able to assert their right against self-incrimination
and law enforcement officers would be suited to elicit more accurate, and less
false, confessions. The Maryland General Assembly therefore must take
action in order for juveniles in the state to be fully protected against selfincrimination during police interrogations.

281. Greer, supra note 274, at 769. In 1984, the United Kingdom passed an act requiring law
enforcement to transition from confrontational interrogation techniques to techniques designed to
draw out factual information, which eventually led to the creation and adoption of the PEACE
technique. Id.
282. Schollum, supra note 257, at 33.
283. See supra Section II.B.
284. See supra Section II.C.1.
285. See supra Section II.C.2.

